Reflections from the Field: Lao PDR, Surveys and Land Release by Pritchard, Stephen
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
Volume 13 
Issue 2 The Journal of ERW and Mine Action Article 10 
August 2009 
Reflections from the Field: Lao PDR, Surveys and Land Release 
Stephen Pritchard 
Norwegian People’s Aid Laos & UXO Lao 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, 
Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and Conflict 
Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pritchard, Stephen (2009) "Reflections from the Field: Lao PDR, Surveys and Land Release," The Journal of 
ERW and Mine Action : Vol. 13 : Iss. 2 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol13/iss2/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction by an 
authorized editor of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu. 
2 | focus | the journal of ERW and mine action | august 2009 | 13.2 | annual issue 13.2 | annual issue | august 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | focus | 3
In mid-September 2008, the Lao National Unexplod-ed Ordnance Programme’s Operations and Quality Management units joined a survey1 team in Khamm-
ouan, a province in the middle of the Laotian panhan-
dle. A farmer had written a letter requesting the clearance 
of unexploded ordnance for his land. It was a typical 
dreary Indochinese afternoon at the end of the rainy sea-
son: muggy, drizzly, heavily rutted roads and crops at full 
growth ready for harvest. Recent floods, the worst since 
recording began in 1922, had devastated the agricultural 
output of the Mekong basin. Fortunately, the farmer’s corn 
crop was safe from the rising waters; his corn had avoid-
ed the fate of the thousands of acres of immature rice that 
had fallen prey to the floods the previous month.
Reflections from the Field: Lao PDR, Surveys 
And Land Release 
by Stephen Pritchard [ NPA–Laos and UXO Lao ]
With an example and a discussion of Norwegian People’s Aid’s work with UXO Lao in Lao 
PDR, the author explains how choosing the right tasks and performing the tasks correctly 
can allow land to be released safely and confidently.
Is she working in the right place? Is she doing the right work?
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR
An Unusual Discovery 
Looking at a map, one would assume that the farm-
er’s land would also be free from another common risk, 
UXO. The nearest bombing was over five kilometers 
(three miles) away and, although the available data is 
incomplete and inaccurate, it generally gives a positive 
correlation among accidents, contamination and pover-
ty. UXO Lao’s management team at Tha Khaek, the pro-
vincial capital of Khammouan, thought this land would 
have a negligible threat of UXO and suspected that the 
farmer’s fear was based on vague “rumors” that circulat-
ed among the locals.
On meeting with the survey team, the farmer point-
ed out the boundaries of the land and explained why 
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it from behind, it is necessary to 
install shock isolators between the 
handler or driving wheel and the 
machine structure. If supporting 
an on-board operator, the seat must 
also be isolated from shock waves 
caused by explosions.
Another key issue in adapt-
ing agricultural technology to 
Technical Survey is armoring. If 
the machine is equipped in a way 
that supports tools at the front, only 
a light shield may be needed to pro-
tect the delicate parts. Otherwise, if 
the machine is originally conceived 
to support tools at the back, as is 
frequently the case, then a system 
to protect the undercarriage from 
possible damage caused by the ex-
plosion of mines must be imple-
mented. A good approach in this 
case is to design special blast-resis-
tant wheels that do not transmit the 
shock associated with an explosion 
to the chassis either by deform-
ing flexibly or by releasing energy 
through frictional pins. Research 
on blast-resistant wheels, shock 
isolators and modular remote-con-
trol systems, if flexible enough to 
be adapted to different agricultural 
machines, would benefit Technical 
Survey processes enormously. 
The Case of BiH
According to the Land-
mine Monitor Report 2008, 170 
square kilometers (42,000 acres) 
of land were released to pub-
lic use through area reduction 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
2007, using 21 accredited demin-
ing machines.14 The estimated area 
that still needs to be cleared con-
sists of 1,738 square kilometers 
(430,000 acres). If we look at the 
number of agricultural tractors in 
the country, approximately 30,000 
units,15 and we imagine temporar-
ily equipping 300 of them, i.e., 1 
percent of all units available, with 
low-cost ground-processing tools 
and light armoring for assessing the 
presence of landmines, assuming 
that each one could have the same 
productivity of one of the 21 ma-
chines used for area reduction in 
2007 (around eight square kilome-
ters [three square miles] per year), 
the problem of landmines in BiH 
could be potentially solved or dras-
tically reduced to small, confined, 
highly contaminated areas in less 
than one year. 
Conclusion
As under-developed countries 
continue to be affected by the world 
food crisis, the need for arable land 
is increasing. Research into more 
responsible agricultural practic-
es is also becoming an imperative 
to fight the dramatic consequences 
of climate change. Investing in the 
redesign of local agricultural tech-
nologies can both speed up mine 
clearance and improve the future 
for mine-affected countries by ad-
dressing these other challenges si-
multaneously. By approaching the 
issue on a local instead of global 
level, more appropriate, sustain-
able and reasonable solutions can 
be achieved while fostering the em-
powerment of local populations.
See Endnotes, page 62 
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In the past year, I have joined several such surveys 
with UXO Lao. In most cases, the need for full clearance 
is beyond question. There are, however, occasional 
requests for the threat level requires clarification 
by Technical Survey or which no further action is 
required. This depends on the land user’s willingness 
to accept the decision, as the goal of land release is to 
instill confidence that land is safe for use based on a 
thorough assessment. Technical Survey and clearance 
are more productively directed toward situations in 
which UXO contamination is highly suspected.
Major international nongovernmental organiza-
tions, such as The HALO Trust, have made significant 
inroads into reducing “exaggerated” contamination 
records using sensible field survey and database re-
view. Across the humanitarian sector in general, such 
credible efforts have tended to be in isolation; most 
surveys have focused on capturing all Suspected Haz-
ardous Areas.
Lao PDR is different—there is no comprehensive 
database of polygons.2 The raw contamination data is 
based on 40-year-old U.S. Air Force bombing records, 
the accuracy of which is mediocre at best, given 
the technological limits at the time of the fighting. 
The original Landmine Impact Survey conducted 
by Handicap International in 1997 has never been 
followed by a comprehensive attempt to measure or 
record UXO contamination. Despite the stipulations 
in Article IV of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 
which Lao PDR has signed and ratified, no such effort 
is planned. Perhaps the condition of the databases in 
other mine-affected countries serves to dissuade rather 
than encourage “baseline survey.” The sheer quantity 
and impact of bombing and ground fighting in Lao 
PDR far exceeds that of most other countries. 
Land Release
Land release is the process of changing the status of 
known or Suspected Hazardous Areas to released land 
using Non-technical Survey, Technical Survey and/or 
clearance in the most relevant, effective and efficient 
manner. Land can be released within a former SHA 
by gathering sufficient information to confirm the ab-
sence of mines or UXO in the area with a high degree 
of certainty and, therefore, recommending that suspi-
cion of mines/UXO should no longer prevent the local 
population from using the land. The concept of land 
Beneficiaries matter. Land release re-distributees limited clearance capacity: It’s not 
just about reducing polygons using a checklist.
X marks the spot: A “bombie” lies near a fruit plantation. Five years ago, many clearance 
tasks were yielding no UXO.
he thought it should be cleared. He had found a large 
piece of sharp metal and assumed it was fragmenta-
tion from a piece of UXO. When questioned by the sur-
vey team, however, the farmer admitted that the land 
around his was in use; he did not know of any ground 
fighting that took place in the area; and he had used 
this plot of land for 10 years without finding UXO. 
There were no credible indicators of ground battles 
or bombing besides the single fragment of metal. We all 
agreed that full clearance would be wasteful and believed 
the farmer simply needed a team to “check his land” as 
a confidence-building measure. The visit of the survey 
team in itself increased his confidence in using the land, 
and a follow-up Technical Survey was scheduled for the 
2009 work plan. 
Surveys
Considering the requirement by most donors 
for using funds effectively, the solution should have 
been land release by Non-technical Survey, which is 
different from the solution chosen above. The planned 
Technical Survey visit by a team wielding detectors 
would not affect the farmer’s use of the land because 
he was already using the land. At the time, UXO Lao 
had yet to adopt land release by Non-technical Survey 
(adopted in 2009).
Farmers in Lao PDR regularly find “bombies” in fields that have been used for several years.
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the quality of the decisions. Right 
now, the tolerance-to-action cor-
relation for UXO is: ·	 If there is reliable, first-hand 
evidence of UXO in or im-
mediately around the land, or 
in the land where an accident 
occurred, the land is subject 
to clearance.·	 If there are rumors of UXO, 
accidents, battles, military 
positions or bombings in or 
around the land, Technical 
Survey is applied.·	 If there are no indicators, the 
land is released following a 
Non-technical Survey.
The above thresholds cannot 
capture and account for every 
eventuality. For instance, what if 
UXO in the land was not in situ? 
What if there are gaps in released 
bombing data? What if nobody is 
available who was in the area dur-
ing the war? Thankfully, UXO Lao 
employs staff with 15 years of op-
erational experience. It is arrogant 
to assume that they would not be 
able to consider such practicali-
ties, and I have every confidence 
that they usually make the right 
decision. However, these decisions 
have to be reviewed consistently 
and with a self-critical eye to en-
sure effectiveness. 
Conclusion
This tale is not a complete suc-
cess story; it is ongoing. Enabling 
our national counterparts to adopt 
a new attitude toward risk—and a 
significant change in the way de-
cisions have traditionally been 
approached—is not easy in the 
West, let alone in Lao PDR, which 
has seen decades of inconsistent, 
and occasionally incompetent, for-
eign assistance. The capability gap 
of nationally-owned operation-
al analysis, maintenance of stan-
dards and monitoring presents a 
significant constraint to the ef-
fective application of land-release 
concepts. Finally, many of these 
improvements have been driven 
by several foreigners who have put 
it on themselves to encourage our 
counterparts to adopt a seeming-
ly alien policy. This is a policy that 
puts their heads, rather than Tech-
nical Advisors’ heads, on the block 
for key decisions. I can see why it 
has taken some time to implement 
this, but in the long run, it will be 
worth it.
GICHD, UNDP and NPA have 
invested time, effort and generous 
donor resources into encouraging 
land-release policy. Different meth-
ods have been employed and the end 
result has been a sustained focus on 
sound risk management and effec-
tiveness of clearance work. UXO 
Lao now has a policy of land release 
consisting of not only clearance but 
Technical and Non-technical Sur-
vey. The methodology incorporates 
the GICHD risk model as well as 
elements of NPA’s project formerly 
known as Enhanced Technical Sur-
vey. Ideally, it will be used consis-
tently and sensibly. Realistically, its 
success depends on many factors, 
some of which seem unlikely to be 
fulfilled in the immediate future. 
NPA has decided to end its land-
release support project with UXO 
Lao. In some measures, the proj-
ect already achieved its goals and in 
others, there remain roadblocks to 
its success. But the 80/20 rule3 ap-
plies, and international agencies are 
not here to substitute for national 
leadership. So on this cheerful, yet 
imperfect note, UXO Lao will take 
the baton in this relay. The race will 
never really be over, but that baton 
has finally changed hands. 
See Endnotes, page 62 
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release emerged because many clearance operators 
constitute a relatively expensive and time-consuming 
clearance capacity for land with limited or no mines 
or UXO. In many cases, the original data reflected 
the best information and tools available at the time. 
Subsequent reviews after years of increased land use 
and shifting indigenous attitude regarding risk and 
mine-action activity changed the perception of these 
recorded areas. In other cases, an inaccurate original 
survey is blamed for over-stating the contamination; 
land release has generally resulted in the reduction of 
land requiring expensive area clearance. If someone 
suspects land is contaminated, we have to do some-
thing but not always clearance. Non-primary clear-
ance tools such as machines and canines are also used 
as land-release methods.
While land release in itself is not a new concept, in-
corporating it as a national policy including survey is 
new. Land release by clearance has been the only avail-
able response option in many countries, including Laos 
until 2007. Though commercial organizations have ap-
plied land-release methodology for decades in their 
own operations, only recently has it been recognized 
by some host governments. The notions of a consistent 
methodology and thresholds of risk tolerance certainly 
are only just emerging in several countries, even those 
with long-established mine-action programs. The chal-
lenge facing the sector is to make sure it does the right 
job, without adding extra layers of confusion.
Government and Clearance in Laos
Broadly speaking, clearance in Laos is reactive rath-
er than proactive. Some international NGOs and com-
panies conduct their own prioritization, and most work 
for clients or development partners who are risk-averse 
and restrictive in the services they will pay for. At the 
operational level, task perimeters are defined by con-
sensus between survey teams and those who request 
clearance. However, this will not capture contaminat-
ed areas adjacent to the area presented for clearance. 
As shown in the above example of the farmer with 
one piece of metal on his land, records have shown 
that some of these requested areas have had no con-
tamination at all. Under such a client-driven system, 
the prioritization process is (arguably) participatory; 
however, the effectiveness of the work is at the mercy 
of the requests.
 The biggest threats to effective land release, as with 
clearance, are maintaining consistent management 
focus and resources. Without adequate resourcing, 
there will not be sufficient monitoring of field activity to 
ensure effective land release. The “great idea” purported 
by land release is relegated to a well-meaning paper 
exercise. Without good activity and policy, release by 
the wrong means may occur. Land release alone is 
no substitute for a well-supported, sensibly-recruited 
and sustained management with good “field time,” as 
well as administrative competence. A dedicated staff 
is needed to visit the field, review decisions and ask, 
“Are we doing the right job, the right way?” The good 
news is that the cost of maintaining such capacities 
is, in the long run, dwarfed by the cost of ineffective 
solutions to seemingly endless polygons or “dodgy 
requests.” The need for consistent oversight of field 
operations increases with organization size. In UXO 
Lao’s case, with 960 staff, a strong central “ownership” 
of operational policies is important. 
Recognizing the need to encourage reform, the 
United Nations Development Programme, NPA and 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining began to collaborate on two main projects. 
In 2005, NPA and UXO Lao conducted a study called 
“Enhancing the Technical Survey.” This led to the En-
hanced Technical Survey project, aimed at supporting 
UXO Lao as it embraced effective land release. The first 
step was to introduce a Technical Survey that would 
discourage full clearance if no UXO was found. Sec-
ondly, a revised Non-technical Survey was devised to 
enable land release in the rare cases in which there 
were no indicators and also to provide baseline data 
for post-clearance assessment. (Both were absent be-
fore: UXO Lao was literally a clearance agency.) At the 
national level, GICHD developed a risk model to sup-
port consistent land-release decisions by clearance op-
erators. Both projects, although technical rather than 
cross-cutting, resulted in a sustained management fo-
cus on selection of UXO area-clearance tasks. Between 
1999 and 2004, a sample of 2,000 records showed only 
two-thirds of UXO Lao’s area-clearance tasks yield-
ed any UXO; by 2007 and 2008, over 98 percent did. 
The positive implications for aid effectiveness are obvi-
ous—UXO Lao is the largest recipient of bilateral do-
nor funding in Lao PDR and is a significant recipient of 
multilateral resources. This does not signify that a per-
fect land-release model has been bequeathed to UXO 
Lao by a handful of international advisers; it shows 
those precious resources are now having a considera-
ble impact. UXO Lao has come a long way in using do-
nations wisely, especially in the past four years. 
Tolerance
The periodic review of risk-tolerance thresholds is 
important. “Targets” must be avoided. Land-release 
performance is not measured in square meters but in 
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